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INTRODUCTION
The
References

to

) ,fl

record
the

using

will

be

transcript

the

referred

will

clerk's

be

volume

to

as

designated
reference

n

R,

) .»

as

"T. M-

(19

volumes,

designated as "A" through "S") and the reporter's page numbers.
When certain lines on a page are referenced, for example Volume
D, page 126, lines 3-14, this format will be used:

(T. D-126:3-

14)."

" and pages

Exhibits will be referred to as "Exhibit

within exhibits as Exhibit 38:1, 5, 8, to refer to pages 1, 5 and
8 of Exhibit 38.

The

(ffApp.lf)

Appendix

includes

the

transcript excerpts demonstrating the comments on the evidence.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Does

a

plaintiff

waive

objections

to

numerous

comments on the evidence involving statements, interruptions and
non-verbal conduct occurring on each day of a 12-day trial, where
plaintiff does not make a contemporaneous objection to every such
comment and does not file an affidavit of prejudice?
2.

Is an expert witness

in a brain-injury

case a

surprise witness where: (a) the expert conducts a Rule 35 IME for
defendants

who

then give notice that the expert will

not be

called; (b) the expert changes his mind and agrees to appear, but
the fact is

concealed

from

plaintiff for

two

to

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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four weeks;

(c) the expert's name appears on a witness list just six

(6)

business days before trial; (d) there is no realistic opportunity
to depose the expert before trial; and

(e) the written report

required by Rule 35 is provided on the third day of trial and is
incomplete?

COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its opinion on February
13, 1990.

The case is currently styled as Emmanuel N. Onyeabor

v. Pro Roofing, Inc., a Utah corporation and Pam Bates, 128 Utah
Adv. Rpt. 23, 787 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1990) (see Attachment A at
end of Brief).

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered on
February 13, 1990.

On March 15, 1990, Petitioner obtained an ex

parte 3 0-day extension of the time to file a Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari, which expired on April 16, 1990.

On April 13,

1990, by stipulation and order of the court, Petitioner obtained
an additional seven-day extension to file this Petition, which
extension

expires

jurisdiction

on April

23, 1990.

over this case pursuant

The

Supreme

Court

has

to Utah Code Ann. 1953,

§78-2-2(3)(a), as amended (1989).
-vi-
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CONTROLLING STATUTES
Two controlling Rules which govern this case are: Rules
26(e) and 35(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (see Attachment B
at end of Brief).

-vii-
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Petitioner, Emmanuel N. Onyeabor, filed a personal
injury action alleging a closed-head organic brain injury and a
herniated lumbar disc.

The case was tried to a jury beginning

February 2, 1987, and continuing through February 18, 1987.

The

jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff but awarding the
sum of only $16,850.

The verdict was reduced by 25% due to a

finding of contributory negligence on the part of Mr. Onyeabor
(R. 658).

A motion for a new trial and additur were both denied

on April 1, 1987 (R. 20-1).

This appeal was timely taken from

the Judgment on Jury Verdict and the order denying the motion for
a new trial and additur with notice of appeal being filed on
April 30, 1987 (R. 722).
Five b^sic issues were presented in the briefs.
issue dealing with plaintiff's alleged contributory

One

negligence

was decided favorably to plaintiff, and two other issues are not
pursued

in this Petition.

The two remaining

Petition deal with the prejudicial

impact

issues

in this

of comments on the

evidence and the appearance of a surprise, expert witness.
The case was argued to the court of appeals in October,
1989.

The decision was issued on February 13, 1990.

//
//
//

1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

COMMENTS ON THE EVIDENCE.

The court made numerous prejudicial

comments

on the

evidence by stating or inferring lack of believability of expert
witnesses and the quality of their evidence; making extraneous
prejudicial statements in ruling on the admissibility of certain
evidence;

and

repeatedly

interrupting

counsel

and

witnesses

without cause and making prejudicial comments in so doing
Tables I and II herein).
contained

in

the

(see

The main objectionable comments are

Appendix.

A

flavor

of

the

nature

of

the

comments can be gleaned by reading Appendices 1, 2 and 3 (Table
I), and 15, 16 and 17 (Table II).
The court also exhibited a prejudicial attitude toward
Mr. Onyeabor and his counsel.

This attitude was reflected in the

court's demeanor including facial expressions, sighs, frowns and
body language (Apps. 36-39).
frequent

refusal

important issues

to

allow

This attitude was also shown by the
counsel

to

approach

(T. B-46, C-76, 1-103).

the

bench

on

In general the court

was very harsh with Mr. Onyeabor1s counsel in front of the jury,
particularly during the first three days of trial (T. D-443-444).
Objections were made to the comments on the evidence
which

occurred

on the during the

first three

days

of trial.

Unfortunately, the reporter had gone home, but court subsequently
acknowledged these objections on the record:
[Judge Croft] And you're absolutely right.
We had a conference, and you in no uncertain
2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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terms stated your objection to not only my
telling them that [about the notebooks], but
you though that I was being very antagonistic
toward you in my conduct of the trial,
(emphasis added)
(T. P-87:18-22) .
B.

FACTS REGARDING DR. LINCOLN CLARK.

During the course of the litigation of this case, there
were five separate trial dates set: 8/14/85, 4/18/86, 11/17/86,
12/8/86 and 2/2/87 (R. 18, 100, 124, 199, 302).

Mr. Onyeaborfs

current counsel entered the case in July of 1986, and promptly
amended the complaint, setting forth the issue of brain injury
and damages more precisely (R. 145). Since the trial was at that
point

scheduled

immediately

for November

moved

plaintiff

to

psychologist

be
(R.

for

a

Rule

performed
155).

17, 1986
35
by

(R.

mental
Edward

124), the
examination

C.

Dr. Beck apparently

Beck,
get

defense
of

Ph.D.,

the
a

sick, so on

November 8, 1986, defendants again moved for a continuance of the
trial (R. 252) .

Defense counsel stated:

The undersigned further represents that he
will use all reasonable efforts to obtain the
services of a substitute expert as rapidly as
possible
consistent
with an
adequate
presentation of the case.
The undersigned
further represents that he will use all
reasonable
efforts
to cooperate
with
plaintifffs
attorney
in providing
an
opportunity to him to discover the substance
of the expert's evaluation and opinion,
(emphasis added)
(R. 255) .

On November 10, 1986, the Motion for Continuance was

heard, and the trial was continued until December 8, 1986 (R.
199) .
3
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During
substitute

that

expert,

psychiatrist.

period,

Dr.

Lincoln

the

defendants

Clark,

a

procured

University

Dr. Clark examined Mr. Onyeabor.

of

a

Utah

Thereafter he

told defense counsel that he categorically would not be a witness
at the trial (T. S-19).
Defendants
strenuously

moved

for

a

continuance,

which

was

opposed by Mr. Onyeabor because of his precarious

medical and psychological condition (T. S-19-21).

Dr. Clark was

therefore

5, 198 6, and

summoned

before the court on December

examined on the record by Judge Dee.
not

under

any

circumstances

testify

Dr. Clark stated he would
at

trial

and

that

his

decision was final and irrevocable:
I've already expressed I want out of
this.
I mean I made that very clear at the
beginning.
And I regret the inconvenience
and everything else it has caused, and I wish
it could be otherwise. I would otherwise be
happy to proceed even with this short notice
involved — that's involved. But I simply—
and I say I thought about this very seriously
before I came to this conclusion because I
had a certain reputation —
myself, I'm
concerned about as a witness, and I don't
want to compromise that ... . And I'm not
going to change my mind. (emphasis added)
T. S-18-19).

Dr. Clark admitted that he had not been threatened

by Mr. Onyeabor; he was simply fearful (T. S-18:6).
Judge Dee reluctantly ordered a fourth continuance of
the

trial

to

allow

the

defendants

to

procure

yet

another

substitute expert witness in the head injury area to replace Dr.
Clark (T. S-26-27).
to

Mr.

Onyeabor's

On December 16, 1986, Mr. Stegall confirmed
counsel

that

the

defense

expert

4
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would

be

psychologist

Robert

Cook,

Ph.D.

On

December

17, 1986,

the

parties appeared before Judge Dee for a scheduling conference,
and the new trial date of February 2, 1987, was set (R. 302).
Mr. Onyeabor was examined by Dr. Cook in Salt Lake City in midJanuary

(T. K-89),

and

his deposition was pre-scheduled

with

counsel for Monday, January 26, 1987, in Denver (App. 40, p. 3 ) .
On Thursday, January

22, 1987, exactly

six business

days prior to trial, Mr. Onyeabor's counsel received a revised
witness list from Mr. Stegall (R.308), which included Dr. Lincoln
Clark as a proposed witness!

This was the first notice

Clark since his "irrevocable" withdrawal

on December

of Dr.

5, 1986.

Because Mr. Stegall was in Denver during January 23-27, 1987,
and because Judge Dee, who was retiring effective January 31,
1987, wanted Judge Croft to hear motions, the first opportunity
to schedule a motion in limine was Friday, January 30, 1987.
At the hearing on the Motion in Limine, Mr. Stegall
indicated he had known about Dr. Clark's
"the first part of January" (T. Q-38).

"reappearance" since

Dr. Clark testified at

trial that he decided to come back into the case some time around
Christmas,

1986

(T. L-127-128).

This was

never

reported

to

plaintiff's counsel, despite many oral and written communications
(App. 40) .

Judge Croft nevertheless denied the Motion in Limine

(R. 326:T. Q-54).
Mr. Onyeabor's counsel did not receive a written report
of the results of Dr. Clark's examination until the third day of
trial, February 4, 1987.

The report was incomplete in that it
5
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did not render a psychiatric diagnosis of Mr. Onyeabor (App. 41:
7).
Dr.

Clark

testified

convincingly

at

trial

(L-76-80,

91,3, 94, 96-97, 103-104, 156-158, 192-193), rendering an opinion
that Mr. Onyeabor suffered numerous pre-existing

psychological

problems (T. L-192-193).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
A PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED, UPON PAIN
OF
WAIVER,
TO MAKE A
CONTEMPORANEOUS
OBJECTION OR FILE A RULE 63 AFFIDAVIT OF
PREJUDICE TO EVERY JUDICIAL COMMENT ON THE
EVIDENCE, WHERE AN EARLY OBJECTION IS LODGED
AND THE COMMENTS ARE NUMEROUS, OCCURRING ON
VIRTUALLY EVERY DAY OF A 12-DAY TRIAL.
A.

IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE

The application of the waiver doctrine in this case is
important to the practice of law in the State of Utah.

The Court

of

requires

Appeals'

decision

contemporaneous
evidence.

objection

wrongly

and

to

of

each

unfairly
many

comments

on

the

This is an impractical and harsh burden on counsel

and litigants, and does not appropriately assign responsibility
to the court.
The
Appeals

in

recognize

doctrine

this

the

case

of waiver
is an

as

obsolete

applied

by

doctrine

realities of the practice

the

Court

of

that

fails

to

of modern

law.

The

Supreme Court, through this case, should take the opportunity to
6
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establish the State of Utah as an adherent of a more modern,
practical approach to waiver.
B.

NUMEROUS PREJUDICIAL COMMENTS ON THE EVIDENCE.
The trial court made numerous comments on the evidence

which could generally be classified as:
that

the

quality

of

plaintiff's

statements or inferences

expert

testimony

was

weak;

disruptive interjections; and non-verbal conduct that indicating
that

the

court

Appendices

favored

1 through

the

35) .

position

of

the

defendants

(see

Utah law prohibits the court from

commenting on the evidence.

Rule 51, U.R.C.P.

This court has

stated:
[A] trial judge is not permitted to comment
on the quality or credibility of the evidence
and may not indicate that the evidence is
either weak or convincing. ... the court is
... enjoined from commenting on the quality
or credibility of the evidence in such a way
as to indicate that it favors the claims or
position of either party. The enjoinder is
necessary to prevent any intrusion upon the
prerogatives of the jury to judge the
credibility of the evidence and to determine
the facts. (emphasis added).
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 493 at 496

(Hall, C.J. concurring and

dissenting) (Utah 1986).

gestures
evidence.

The

court's

demeanor,

including

and

actions

can

amount

interpreted

evidence.

to

a

expressions,

comment

on

the

Egede-Nissen v. Crystal Mountain, Inc., 606 P.2d 1214

(Wash. 1980).

concerning

also

facial

Any statement or action that can be reasonably
to

the
Id.

indicate
veracity

of

the

court's

witnesses,

belief
is

a

or

disbelief

comment

on

the

Comments made during a trial which influence the
7

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

jury

concerning

the

merits

of

the

case,

or

which

affect

substantial rights of litigants, constitute grounds for reversal.
Messier v. Simmons Gun Specialties, Inc., 687 P.2d

121 at 129

(Okla. 1984).
Interjections

and

interruptions

may

constitute

a

comment on the evidence, particularly where they occur or are
"phrased in a manner indicative of the court's attitude towards
the merits of the case ..."
cumulative

effect

of

Eqede-Nissen, supra at 1222.

repeated

interjections

by

the

court

The
or

comments on the evidence may constitute reversible error, even
though

each

error.

Eqede-Nissen, supra at 1223.
C.

such

interjection,

standing

alone,

might

not

be

OBJECTION WAS LODGED, CONTRARY TO STATEMENTS IN
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION.
The Court of Appeals1 Opinion

(hereinafter

"Opinion")

infers that plaintiff made no objection on the record to court's
comments on the evidence, thereby waiving the objection.

The

Opinion states that Utah law therefore precludes appellate review
of

the

issue.

This analysis

is faulty

for several

reasons.

First, it is undisputed that plaintiff did make an objection to
the court's comments on the evidence and prejudicial demeanor at
the end of the third day of trial.
reporter had

Unfortunately, the court

gone home, but the objections and the

thereof was acknowledged by the court on the record:
[Judge Croft] And you're absolutely right.
We had a conference, and you in no uncertain
terms stated your objection to not only my
telling them that [about the notebooks], but
8
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substance

TABLE I

DIRECT COMMENTS ON EVIDENCE BY TRIAL COURT

| Very Serious"!
App. Day of
No. Trial/Date

Witness Name/
Called By

Transcript
Vol, /Page

1.

Alan Heal (P)

J 175-180,
182

8 - 2/11

Substance and Effect of Comment on Evidence
Court expresses doubt that Mr. Onyeabor will ever go out and get a job as a
superintendent of a construction project; casts doubt on Heal's opinion as to
what Onyeabor would have made and interjects statements that emphasize that
Heal's opinion is not valid for the U.S. but only for Nigeria; casts doubt
upon Onyeabor1s income potential.

2.

8 - 2/12

Boyd Pjeldsted K 18-22
(P)

Judge casts doubt on validity of expert's testimony as to value of lost future
earnings by referring to it as "pure speculation"; reveals his opinion of Mr.
Onyeabor1s earning potential by allowing only testimony of $5.00 per hour.

3.

7 - 2/10

Edward Spencer I 45-46
M.D. (D)

Interjects comments that emphasize negative aspects of witness's testimony
about Onyeabor.

4.

11 - 2/17

Linda Gummow,
Ph.D. (P)

M 29-30

Judge offered opinion that counsel had not asked a certain question; (he was
wrong - see T. 193-4 (2/12)).

5.

7 - 2/10

Linda Gummow,

H 29-31

Court indicates sua sponte opinion that expert is not qualified to render an
opinion as to whether Onyeabor was unconscious at scene because expert wasn't
present.

3 - 2/04

11 - 2/17

Thomas
D 325, 333, Judge discredits documentary evidence by making disparaging comments about use
Soderberg, M.D.
348, 382, of exhibit notebooks given to jurors at beginning of trial; severely scolds
Gerald Moress,
383, 443, counsel in front of jury.
M. D.
444
Richard
Nielsen, M.D.
(P)
Linda Gummow,
Ph.D. (P)

M 49-53

On issue of using treatises to rebut prior witness's testimony, judge makes
numerous comments that cast discredit upon plaintiff's expert by expressing
dubiety on methods employed by the witness.
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TABLE I CONTINUED
App. Day of
No. Trial/Date

Witness Name/
Called By

Transcript
Vol./Page

Substance and Effect of Comment on Evidence
| Serious |

8.

2 - 2/03

Dennis Leavitt, C 76-79
(P)

Judge expresses doubt that Onyeabor•s car struck center median, causing him
to be jostled; casts plaintiff's theory of mechanism of injury into doubt;
and cross-examines witness.

9.

2 - 2/03

Dennis Leavitt, C 72
Officer (P)

Judge comments that the officer's experience did not justify him in expressing opinion that Onyeabor could have struck head; casts doubt on plaintiff's
theory of head trauma causing brain injury.

Richard Goka
M.D. (P)

D 483E 495-6

Judge says he is "troubled" by a glossary of terms and states that most words
used by the doctor "don't mean a thing to us ... I am sure they don't to the
jury"; effectively casts doubt on testimony of expert medical witnesses.

Linda Gummow
Ph.D. (P)

F 845

Judge interjects sua sponte and cuts off witness who is explaining future
risk of head injury to plaintiff; thereby implies little risk.

10. 3-4 - 2/042/05
11.

5 - 2/06

| Important)
12.

3 - 2/04

Patrick Chukwu
(P)

D 295

Judge refers to Nigerian witness as one of "these young ones," demeaning this
witness and other younger Nigerians who had previously testified.

13.

8 - 2/11

Elizabeth
Onyeabor (P)

J 132-135

Casts doubt about ability of wife to have knowledge of and comment on why
plaintiff took certain classes more than once, and why he had certain grades.

14.

2 - 2/03

Dennis Andrews
(P)

C 142-144

Questions witness sua sponte about details of accident leaving impression
that witness was perhaps not thorough.

775/CHART1
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TABLE II

INTERJECTIONS AND INTERRUPTIONS (SUA SPONTE)* BY TRIAL COURT

1 Very Serious Interruptions tl
App. Day of
No. Trial/Date

Witness Name/
Called By

Transcript
Vol./Page

Substance and Effect of Interjection or Interruption

15.

3 - 2/04

Richard Nielsen
M.D. (P)

D 460

Judge invites opposition to object to expert's qualifications; casts doubt
upon expert's qualifications.

16.

6 - 2/09

Mark Zelig,
Ph.D. (P)

G 95-96

Judge interjects comment to help defense; scolds plaintiff's expert witness;
one of few instances in trial where judge interjected during defense examination.

17.

8 - 2/11

Alan Heal (P)

J 187

Judge interjects to help defense; questions plaintiff's expert on basis of
opinion.

18.

6 - 2/09

Mark Zelig,
Ph.D. (P)

G 66-67

Judge interjects and tells jury that the doctor is "broadening his answer
... too much."

19.

9 - 2/12

Boyd Fjeldsted
(P)

K 9

Rude interjection which implies that plaintiff's counsel has suggested an
answer.

20.

8 - 2/11

Alan Heal (P)

J 196

Rude and unnecessary interjection which suggests that plaintiff's expert
has not answered a question posed by defense counsel.

21.

8 - 2/11

David Nilsson
Ph.D. (P)

J 63

Rude interruption during plaintiff's examination of expert suggesting that
expert has exceeded his expertise.

22.

3 - 2/04

Gerald Moress,
M.D. (P)

D 422

Interjects to question expert witness about where plaintiff hit his head.

23.

9 - 2/12

Robert Cook,

K 209

Court interjects to help defense witness on re-cross as to what was said
earlier.
1 Serious Interruptions |

24.

4 - 2/05

Richard Goka,
M.D. (P)

E 497

Questions plaintiff's expert as to whether he understands certain head
injury terms from a glossary.

* Raised by the court without defense counsel objections.

f Other serious interjections are cataloged in Table I,
Tab Nos. 3, 5, 6, and 11.
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TABLE II CONTINUED
App. Day of
No. Trial/Date

Witness Name/
Called By

Transcript
Vol./Page

Substance and Effect of Interjection or Interruption

J 38

Questions plaintiff's expert about something that "troubled me" regarding
scope of jury's decision to decide the case.

25.

8 - 2/11

David Nilsson,
Ph.D. (P)

26.

5 - 2/06

Duncan Wallace, F 744-5
M.D. (P)

27.

8 -- 2/11

David Nilsson,
Ph.D. (P)

J 9

28.

6 -- 2/09

Mark Zelig,
Ph.D. (P)

G 9

Emmanuel
Onyeabor (P)

M 6

Richard Goka,
M.D. (P)

D 4

29. 11 -- 2/17
30.

3 -- 2/04

Judge interjects to unnecessarily restrict plaintiff's re-direct examinanation on expert witness's own drop in IQ after expert's gas poisoning head
injury; defense counsel had earlier raised the issue of expert's own injury
on cross-examination to impeach expert's objectivity.
Interjects in attempt to narrow scope of answer by plaintiff's expert.
Interrupts to help defense counsel's examination on issue of grades.
Interrupts plaintiff's answer to important question.
Interjects to try to narrow scope of witness's expertise.
1 Unnecessary and Disruptive Interjections [

31.

7 - 2/10

Emmanuel
Onyeabor (P)

I 103

Price of left-front tire repair offered to show that plaintiff did in fact
hit the median strip and was severely jostled; witness hassled by judge.

32.

3 - 2/04

Stevens
Pedersen (P)

D 311-12

Didn't want plaintiff's father-in-law to testify about the fact that he was
hard of hearing; offered to lay foundation that plaintiff's wife would
notice hearing problems in plaintiff caused by the accident.

33.

3 - 2/04

Richard Goka,
M.D. (P)

D 476-7

Interrupted to get evidence admitted before plaintiff's counsel had
finished laying foundation.

34.

3 - 2/04

Richard Nielson D 456
M.D. (P)

Unnecessary scolding of counsel on evidentary matter.

35.

Many/
Various

Patrick Chukwu Many
Mr. Onyeabor
Pamela Walker, MA
Stevens Pedersen
Richard Goka, M.D.
Linda Gummow, Ph.D.
Mark Zelig, Ph.D. (P)

Many rude, unnecessary, annoying interruptions and interjections that
amounted to witness intimidation.

775/CHART3
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vou
thought
that
I was being
very
antagonistic toward you in my conduct of the
trial. (emphasis added)
(T. P-87:18-22).

The objections were also referenced

in Mr,

Onyeabor's motion for a new trial (R. 694-5) and the argument on
the motion for a new trial (T. P-24-.19-22).
The

Opinion

finds

that

such

an

objection,

though

undisputedly made, cannot be countenanced on appeal because there
was no record, citing Birch v. Birch, 771 P. 2d 1114 (Utah App.
1989) and Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040 at
1045

(Utah 1983).

However, those cases do not stand for that

proposition, and should not apply to the facts of this case.

In

Birch, for example, the trial court allegedly told the appellant
in an off-the-record discussion that his mind was made up before
the trial.

The appellant entered

into a stipulation and then

asked to have the resulting order set aside 88 days later.

The

alleged remarks were disputed by the court and opposing counsel,
and there was no reference in the record whatsoever to support
the appellant's contention.

Birch, supra at 1116.

However, in

Onyeabor the court acknowledges the substance of the objections
having been made in a timely manner.
In

Franklin,

the

appellant

claimed

an

argument

raised in the hearing on a motion for summary judgment.

was

However,

there was no evidence supporting his claim that the argument was
in fact raised at that time.

The Franklin court stated:

For a question to be considered on appeal,
the record must clearly show that it was
timely presented to the trial court in a
manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon;
9
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we cannot merely assume that it was properly
raised.
Franklin, supra at 1045.
record

or

briefs

to

In Franklin, there was nothing in the

show

the

objection

was

ever

made.

In

Onyeabor, there is a reference in the record acknowledging the
objection.
something

The Franklin opinion suggests that if there had been
in the record

to

indicate the argument, the result

would have been different.
The

Court

Appeals1

of

Opinion

also

refers

to

a

requirement of filing a Rule 63(b) affidavit alleging judicial
bias,

and

infers

that

absent

such

an

affidavit

of

bias,

Petitioner's claims are not properly before the court on appeal.
The Opinion states: "we need not decide, however, whether the
sole failure to file this affidavit was procedurally fatal to the
claim of bias ..." because of other alleged infirmities.

Thus,

it would appear that references to the Rule 63(b) affidavit are
dictum, and not the basis of the decision herein.
the

citation

involves

an

of

the

Birch

on-the-record

timely objection.

case

is

In any event,

inappropros.

acknowledgement

by

the

Onyeabor
court

of

a

There is no such acknowledgement of a timely

objection in Birch.
D.

STRICT, INFLEXIBLE APPLICATION OF THE WAIVER DOCTRINE
IS BAD PUBLIC POLICY AND DENIES SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE.
The Court of Appeals has applied the waiver doctrine in

this

and

other

cases with

an

inflexible,

meat-ax

approach.

Essentially, under the standard set forth in Onyeabor, if a

10
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contemporaneous objection is not lodged to each comment on the
evidence, it is waived.

The court stated:

Although
reluctance
to make
frequent
objections may be understandable, we failed
to find in the portions of the record
highlighted by plaintiff even one such
contemporaneous obj ection.
Onyeabor, supra at p. 527.
In support of that position, the Court of Appeals does
not

cite

even

evidence."
with

an

that

deals

oral

with

and

argument

on

"comments

on

the

Franklin Finance dealt
a

motion

for

summary

The court also cites Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah 2d 55,

377 P.2d

unjust

case

Birch dealt with bias
unrecorded

judgment.
58,

one

186, 188

(1962), for the proposition that it is

for a party to just sit silently by, though believing

prejudicial error has been committed, and then belatedly assert
the issue on appeal.
to

object

to

the

However, Hill deals with failure of a party

introduction

of

evidence

of

insurance, and

subsequent failure to ask for an instruction to rectify the harm
that was done.

The Opinion cites Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav.

& Loan, 767 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah App. 1988).

In Madsen, the judge

indicated before ruling that he was a customer of the defendant
bank.

Despite the clear disclosure

of the conflict, defense

counsel made no motion to recuse the judge until 39 days after
the decision.
Thus, none of the cases cited by the Court of Appeals
in support of its requirement of a contemporaneous objection deal
with comments on the evidence, which is the issue in Onyeabor.
11
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It seems strange indeed that when Petitioner writes 4 0 pages of
brief

(main and reply briefs) on the issue of "comments on the

evidence,11 cites seven cases dealing with failure to object to
comments on the evidence and attaches 4 0 appendices relevant to
that issue, the Court of Appeals does not even cite one relevant,
factually similar case that supports it's position.
Petitioner has no quarrel with the general rule that
objections

should

However,

this

generally
rule

be waived

should

not

if not made

at trial.

inflexibly

applied,

be

particularly in cases such as this, where the objections would be
futile, counterproductive or could not correct the error.

One

treatise commented:
However, because of the special status of the
trial judge in the eyes of the jury,
prejudicial and erroneous comments by the
trial judge during the trial may be reviewed
on appeal even where not objected to at the
time they are made. (emphasis added)
75 Am. Jur. 2d, "Trial, " §120, p.218.

The court should not

find a waiver where it is obvious that continued objections to
repeated

comments

on

the

exacerbate the prejudice.
(Ky.

1958),

the

trial

direct examination

evidence would

simply

emphasize

and

In Collins v. Sparks, 310 S.W.2d 45

judge

questioned

a witness

during

the

of a rear-end collision case and asked, in

conclusion, "You honestly believe that?"

No objection was made.

The reviewing court noted that the remarks imputed that the judge
did not believe the witness1 testimony, which was critical to the
case.

The appellate court overturned the jury's verdict in this

case, noting:
12
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When the trial judge makes an objectionable
remark, counsel is faced with a dilemma. He
may risk antagonizing a judge by calling
attention to the objectionable remarks, which
scarcely can be erased in the minds of the
jurors by a subsequent admonition.
If
objection is made unsuccessfully, the harm
may be aggravated, and the situation may be
worsened.
He may make no objection in the
hope that the jury will ignore the remark.
This places the counsel
in an unfair
position and at a disadvantage which may not
be due to any conduct on his part. The trial
judge is charged with knowing how to conduct
a fair and impartial trial. He should know
what is necessary to be said and when it
should be said, bearing in mind the possible
effect on the jury. Viewed in this light, an
objection to the remarks of a trial judge is
unnecessary, and when such remarks are
prejudicial, they constitute such palpable
error as will be considered on review....
Id. at 48-49.

In the Collins case, the court noted that a motion

for a new trial on the issue preserved the right to object on
appeal, even though no objection was made at trial.

In Onyeabor,

the issues raised in this brief were argued extensively in the
motion

for

opportunity

new
to

trial,

which

provided

correct the error and

the

trial

the prejudice

court
if

an

it so

desired (R. 694-695).
The futility of continued contemporaneous objections by
counsel

in

this

case

is

manifest.

The

court

acknowledged

counsel's strong objection at the end of the third day of trial
(T. P-87:18-22
objection . . . " ) .

"... and you in no uncertain terms stated your
Yet, perusal of Tables I and II show that 23 of

Petitioner's 35 claimed comments on the evidence occurred after
the third day of trial.

Thus, despite the clearly acknowledged

objection, the objectionable conduct continued.
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The

Court

of

Appeals1

Opinion

puts

counsel

in

the

position of losing a possibly winnable case by antagonizing the
jury because of perceived "attacks" on the judge, or to lose it
by

forfeiting

objection

was

particularly

all

rights

not

lodged.

where

the

on

appeal
Such

courtf s

a

because

contemporaneous

requirement

demeanor

and

is

unfair,

attitude

was

prejudicial throughout the trial and the comments on the evidence
were

frequent, pervasive and came without warning.

One court

characterized the effect on the jury of the judge fs actions as
follows:
Every lawyer who has ever tried a case, and
every judge who has ever presided at a trial,
knows that the jurors are inclined to regard
the
lawyers engaged
in the trial
as
partisans, and are quick to attend an
interruption by the judge, to which they may
attach an importance and a meaning in no way
intended.
It is the working of human nature
of which all men who have had any experience
in the trial of case may take notice.
Between the contrary winds of advocacy, a
juror would not be a man if he did not, in
some of the distractions of mind which attend
a hard-fought and doubtful case, grasp the
words and manner of the judge as a guide to
lead him out of perplexity.
On the other
hand, a presiding judge has no way to measure
the effect of his interruption.
The very
fact that he takes a witness away from the
attorney for examination may, in the tense
atmosphere of a trial, lead to great
prejudice. (emphasis added)
State v. Jackson, 145 P. 470 (Wash. 1915), quoted with approval
in Risley v. Moberg, 419 P.2d 151 at 153 (Wash. 1966).
The difficulty of repeated objections by counsel and
interjections

by

the

judge

and

their

impact

on

the

jury

is

evident when one postulates possible contemporaneous objections.
14
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For example, the objection to the comments in Appendix 1 would
have gone something like this:
Your honor, I object to your inference that
you do not believe that Mr. Onyeabor could
have
obtained
a job
as
construction
superintendent (T. J-177; App. 1 ) ; or
I object to your statement that jobs Mr.
Onyeabor could have held in Nigeria are
irrelevant,
even
though Mr. Heal, a
qualified rehabilitation expert has said that
they are relevant (T. J-180, 182; App. 1 ) .
With respect to Appendix 2, the objection might have read:
I object to your statement that my expert
economist's testimony is "pure speculation,"
just because it is based in part upon
functions and income of Mr. Onyeabor in
Nigeria. That is a matter of weight for the
jury.
The objection to the comment in Appendix 3 could have read:
Your Honor, I object to you unnecessarily
emphasizing, sua sponte, that my client's
medical
records show some
"hysterical
features."
The objection to the comment in Appendix 15 would have read:
Your Honor, I object to your sua sponte
inference that Dr. Richard Nielsen has not
been qualified and is not an expert in the
field of otolaryngology, and that there is no
foundation for his testimony.
Although in real life, the objections would have been tempered a
little more, the prejudicial impact would not likely escape the
jury's notice.
Had

contemporaneous

objections

been

made,

it

undoubtedly would have sparked additional prejudicial exchanges
such as the one which occurred in Appendix 6 over the use of the
exhibit

notebooks.

On

that

occasion,

counsel
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attempted

an

objection of sorts to the court's instruction to the jury not to
refer

to

exhibit

notebooks.

That

incident

provoked

a

more

prejudicial exchange with the court than if nothing had been said
(T. D-443-4; App. 6 ) .
E.
The

THE WAIVER DOCTRINE IS OBSOLETE,

Court

of Appeals

has not correctly

waiver doctrine in this case.
the waiver

doctrine

in this

applied

the

A fact-sensitive application of
case

should

produce

a

different

result. However, in the event this Court determines the doctrine
to have been correctly applied by the Court of Appeals, then the
doctrine

itself should be discarded as it relates to judicial

improprieties because it is obsolete.

Other states have done so.

In Commonwealth v. Hammer, 494 A.2d 1054

(Pa. 1985),

the trial judge conducted an extensive and repeated examination
of witnesses and was charged by the defendant as acting ofttimes
in

the

role

exhibiting
was

made

of

an

advocate

for

the

prosecution,

incredulity at defendant's testimony.
by

questioning
Pennsylvania

the
of

defense

witnesses,

had

adhered

counsel
so
to

the
the

to

the

doctrine

No objection

court's

prosecution
of

sometimes

manner

claimed
waiver,

of

waiver.
but

the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court questioned "the continued validity of
the waiver

doctrine

as applied

to

improprieties

of the trial

judge;11 strict enforcement of the doctrine "becomes inadvisable11
when the position of power and authority enjoyed by the trial
judge is considered.

Id.

at 1058.

The Pennsylvania court
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explained the policy of not requiring an objection in this type
of case as follows:
The
efficacy
of counsel
in
assuring
impartiality of the judge is negated by this
self-regulatory function and the authority
of the bench, for a judge who poses a
question or makes a comment during trial is
predisposed to believe that the question or
comment is proper, lest it not be spoken.
Given that predisposition, the likelihood
that the judge will be well-cautioned by
counsel's objection is negligible.
In that
context, the rationale underlying the waiver
doctrine, that timely objection gives the
court the opportunity to cure the error,
becomes a relatively empty one. Indeed, the
possibility exists that counsel•s objection
would be viewed as a source of annoyance and
may well aggravate the situation.
(emphasis
added)
Id.

at

1059.

Onyeabor's

This

counsel

was

in

precisely

this

the

case.

predisposition against Onyeabor.

situation

The

court

faced

exhibited

by
a

A strong objection was voiced

at the end of the third day of trial.

The problems continued.

The court's demeanor was harsh and intimidating throughout the
trial as witnessed by the four affiants
through

39) .

respondents

The

argue

"opportunity

to

(see Appendix Nos. 3 6

cure

the

for in this case would

error"

that

have been truly

the
an

"empty one."
Petitioner does not argue necessarily that this Court
should throw out the waiver doctrine entirely, as some courts
have

done.

Rather,

Petitioner proposes

a balanced,

flexible

approach, particularly where it is obvious that contemporaneous
objection would have been to no avail.
shows

a

repeated

inclination

to

comment

Where the trial judge
on

the
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evidence, to

interject statements in the record sua sponte, and/or exhibits

a

demeanor and attitude which is prejudicial (Appendices 3 6-39), a
flexible

approach

to

the waiver

doctrine

is warranted.

The

suggested position is:
If there is a reasonable possibility that a
timely objection would have cured or resolved
the problem, then the objection should be
deemed waived; however, where the comments or
conduct are so frequent or significant that
an
objection would
likely be
futile,
counterproductive or otherwise meaningless,
contemporaneous objection should not be
required as long as the matter is raised in a
post-trial motion.
Such a position would not only be reasonable and in
harmony with the position of many other states, but would also
have significant benefit for both the bench and the bar in Utah.
A strict application of the waiver rule puts the entire burden of
waiver at trial on counsel, and hence on the public who are the
litigants.

Thus, under the "strict" approach, attorneys and the

public bear the burden

even

for the errors of judges.

judges as individuals are given a pre-eminent position in
law.

Yet,
the

They are supposedly chosen from the better lawyers, and are

presumed to have above-average abilities, knowledge of the law
and wisdom.

Judges were described in one case as follows:

The judge occupies an exalted and dignified
position; he is the one person to whom the
jury, with
rare exception,
looks
for
guidance, and from whom the litigants expect
absolute impartiality. ...
To depart from
the clear line of duty through questions,
expressions or conduct, contravenes the
orderly administration of justice.
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Commonwealth v. Mvma. 123 A. 486, at 487 (Pa, 1924) , as cited in
Hammer, supra at 1058.
A strict application of the waiver doctrine is not only
unfair to the public and their attorneys, but, in the long run,
harmful to the bench.

It reduces the incentive for a judge to

conduct a trial in a fair, impartial and responsible manner.

It

rewards poor judicial conduct rather than encouraging excellence.
Strict enforcement of the waiver doctrine also demeans
the judiciary in the eye of the public.

If a judge conducts a

trial in an arbitrary and capricious manner and "gets away with
it," no matter how outrageous or egregious the facts may be, it
will appear to the public participants that a "technicality" is
being used to deny substantial justice, and that arbitrary judges
are above the law.
The balanced approach proposed by Mr. Onyeabor places a
proper amount of responsibility both on counsel and judges.
says that both must be competent and responsible.
the fair administration of justice.

It

It promotes

The court should adopt this

approach.
F.

THE COURT ERRED IN STRIKING AFFIDAVITS TO
SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD.

The Opinion stated that there was nothing in the record
to contradict defendants1 claim that the comments on the evidence
were simply
528.

"explanatory" or "clarifying."

The court's

Opinion, supra at

footnote indicates that although

Petitioner

submitted four memoranda "attesting ... non-verbal manifestations
of bias on the part of the judge" and the motion to supplement
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the record was provisionally granted, the court was now denying
the

motion

to

supplement.

The

affidavits

Appendix Nos. 36, 37, 38 and 39.

are

included

as

Because of the unusual nature

of this case, such affidavits should be countenanced on appeal.
Defendants had the opportunity to respond with counteraffidavits.
There is no other way to show non-verbal conduct, which simply
will

not

appear

within

the

four

corners

of

the

record.

Accordingly, Petitioner requests this court overrule the Court of
Appeals and accept the affidavits.
G.
The

Court

of

SUMMARY.

Appeals

Opinion

tells

the

average

practitioner that if a judge comments on the evidence, he has to
take a bad situation and make it worse in order to preserve the
issue

for

unwise.

appeal.

That

position

is

impractical,

unfair

and

It is impractical and unrealistic to ask trial counsel

to antagonize a jury and a judge, which most assuredly

would

happen, by making a contemporaneous objection to every comment on
the evidence, where the comments are numerous.

In this case, it

was very important for the Petitioner to try the case, and not
have a fifth continuance for medical reasons.

Good judicial and

social policy dictates that the court should adopt a flexible
approach to the waiver doctrine and not require contemporaneous
objection

where

damaging

to

the

the

objections

plaintiff's

would
case

be

than

fruitless
silence.

alternative, the court should reject the waiver doctrine.
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or
In

more
the

POINT II
DR. LINCOLN CLARK, A DEFENSE PSYCHIATRIST,
WAS A PREJUDICIAL SURPRISE WITNESS BECAUSE:
HIS REAPPEARANCE IN THE CASE WAS CONCEALED
FROM PETITIONER UNTIL SIX BUSINESS DAYS
BEFORE TRIAL; THERE WAS NO REALISTIC CHANCE
TO TAKE A MEANINGFUL DEPOSITION; THE DOCTOR'S
RULE 35 IME REPORT WAS NOT PROVIDED UNTIL THE
THIRD DAY OF TRIAL AND WAS INCOMPLETE; AND
THE DOCTOR'S TESTIMONY CAUSED PREJUDICE.
A.

IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE,

The effect
allow very

decision

late notice of a major expert witness.

notice will
U.R.C.P.

of the Court of Appeals1

be

deemed

substantial

is to

Such late

compliance with Rule

26(e)

(duty to seasonably supplement discovery responses on

identity of expert witnesses) as long as the other side conducts
thorough cross-examination at trial and has called experts on the
same subject matter.
This ruling will lessen the standards of practice among
litigating

attorneys.

However,

this

Petition

presents

an

opportunity to make an important statement that unfair discovery
tactics will not be tolerated.

Such a statement is necessary to

uphold the perceived fairness of the system.
that

application

of

the

pre-trial

It is important

discovery

rules

has

the

appearance of being fair and even handed.
B.
Rule

SURPRISE WITNESSES SHOULD BE EXCLUDED.
26(e)(1)

provides

that

a party

has

a duty

to

"seasonably . . . supplement his response with respect to ... the
identity
witness

of
at

each

person

trial.

..."

expected
The

to be

court

called

should

as

exclude
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an
a

expert
defense

medical

expert

testimony

is

Superior

where

not

Court,

Alexander,

name

disclosed
706

462 A.2d

Terrebone Airport

the

P.2d
1216

in
763

and/or
a

subject

timely

(Ariz.

(Md. App.

Com f n, 450 So.2d

manner.

App.

1985);

of

the

Acosta

v.

Hadid

v.

1983); Lodrigue v. Houma1004

(La. App. 1984) ; and

Sturdivant v. Yale-New Haven Hosp.. 476 A.2d
1984) .

matter

1074

(Conn. App.

Exclusion of the witness is further justified where no

report or a late report is prepared, or where the report does not
disclose important information.
hindered.
Cir.
(W.D.

Otherwise, cross-examination is

Hoover v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 611 F.2d 1132 (5th

1980); Sirianni v. General Motors Corp., 325 F.Supp. 509
Pa.

1971);

DeMarines v.

KLM

Royal

Dutch

Airlines,

433

F.Supp. 1047 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
The trial court abuses its discretion if it denies a
Rule 59(a)(3) motion for a new trial where there is a surprise
"which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.11
v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977).
by

Rule

59(a) must

result

from

some

Jensen

The surprise contemplated
adverse

circumstance

or

situation in which a party is placed unexpectedly to his injury,
and without any fault or negligence of his own.

Havas v. Haupt,

583 P.2d 1094, 1095 (Nev. 1978).
C.

DR. CLARK WAS A SURPRISE WITNESS.

Dr. Clark was most assuredly a surprise witness.
irrevocably left the case on December 5, 1986.

He

Notice of his

reappearance was not received until Thursday, January 22, 1987,
just six business days prior to trial.
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Dr.
concealed

Clark's

from

reappearance

Petitioner

for two to

requirements of Rule 26(e)(1).
Motion

in

the

case was

obviously

four weeks, despite the

At the hearing on Petitioner's

in Limine to exclude Dr. Clark, defense counsel stated

that he had known about Dr. Clark's reappearance since "the first
part of January" (T. Q-38-39).

Yet, Petitioner's counsel was not

served with a notice until January 21st.

There was no written

report as required by Rule 35 until the morning of the third day
of

trial,

February

4,

1987.

Neither

delay

has

ever

been

explained.
Dr. Clark's own trial testimony is puzzling and evasive
on the issue:
Q. (Mr. Sykes): When did you do that [offer
to re-enter the case]?
A.
(Dr. Clark): I have forgotten the exact
date when that occurred?
Q. Early in January, late in December?
A.
I think that Mr. Steqall would have to
answer that.
Q. I am asking you.
A. I do not have a record, of that, when it
was exactly.
Q.
Well do you —
it has only been two
months. Do you recall approximately, was it
before or after Christmas?
A. Well, I think it was after Christmas, but I am not
certain of that. (emphasis added)
(T. L-127-128).

Prior to Dr. Clark's reappearance, all of the

correspondence and oral conversation between counsel

indicated

that Dr. Cook of Denver would be defendants' only expert witness
on the issue of brain injury.

(App. 40 and 41)

prepared for trial accordingly.
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Petitioner

Courts generally refuse to allow surprise experts to
testify in similar situations.

For example, in Hoover v. U.S.

Dept. of Interior, supra, the Court held that an opposing party
is

entitled

to

discover

the

substance

opinions of the expected testimony.

of

the

facts

and

the

"The primary purpose of this

required disclosure is to permit the opposing party to prepare an
effective cross-examination."
"effective

(emphasis added)

cross-examination"

is

precisely

Petitioner with respect to Dr. Clark.

Id. at 1142.
what

was

An

denied

In the case of DeMarines

v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, supra, the defendant in an airline
decompression case called a doctor of whom no prior notice was
given, to testify that the Petitioner's condition resulted from
pre-existing
case).

causes

The

(similar to Dr. Clark's testimony

Petitioner's

counsel

objected

to

in this

this

improper

testimony on the grounds that the report furnished to him by the
doctor

did

not contain

any

such diagnosis.

The trial

judge

excluded the testimony ruling:
I am not going to permit that testimony if
there is not something [about the problem] in
this report because, frankly, the very reason
for handing over reports is so that both
sides will be aware of what is going on and
not be sprung any surprises.
(emphasis
added)
Id.

at

1058.

The

parties be informed

Court

also

noted

the

importance

that

all

"before trial as to the substance of the

other party's expert testimony in order that he may be prepared
to meet this testimony and will not be surprised by it."
1059.

Id. at

The appellate court, therefore, found no prejudicial error
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in excluding the doctor's testimony.
supra,

Sturdivant

v.

Yale-New

Accord, Hadid v. Alexander,

Haven

Hosp.,

supra

(the

court

correctly refused to allow a party's medical expert to testify
where the party had claimed that although the medical expert had
been informally consulted previously, he had not been formally
retained until the day after the jury selection began; the court
characterized

this

conduct

as

"tactical

subterfuge,lf

which

justified the sanction).
The policy reasons for forbidding a last minute expert
to testify where the untimeliness of notice is unexplained are
well set out in the case of Acosta v. Superior Court, supra,
which

has

amazing

parallels

to

Qnyeabor.

In

Acosta,

the

plaintiff was a petitioner in a wrongful death malpractice action
scheduled

for trial on September 4, 1985.

interest was an anesthesiologist.
did not include a certain doctor.

The real party in

The defense list of witnesses
Two days after the deadline

for filing notice of witnesses, and 18 days prior to the trial
date,

defense

counsel

apparently

received

a

letter

from

doctor containing his opinion as to the cause of death.

the
The

defense counsel notified the plaintiff's counsel that the doctor
would be a witness but did not furnish a report until 13 days
later, or five days before trial.
unavailable

for

deposition

until

The witness in question was
trial.

The

trial

judge

indicated his intention to allow the witness to testify, and the
plaintiff brought a special action appealing the trial court's
refusal to strike the expert witness.

The appellate court held
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that the trial court had abused its discretion, and vacated the
order allowing testimony by the witness.

The appellate court

stated that preclusion of a witness:
. . . should only be invoked where there is
both
absence
of good
cause
for the
untimeliness and prejudice to the opposing
party. Both conditions are met on the facts
of this case.
Counsel for the [defendants]
has suggested no reason for the late
revelation of the witness save failure of his
clients to discovery him until the eve of
trial. This is not good cause; dilatoriness
never is.
Beyond this, no reason was
advanced for withholding the content of the
witness1 testimony for an additional two
weeks. (emphasis added)
Id. at 764.
D.

PREJUDICE CAUSED BY DR. CLARK.

The Court

of Appeals Opinion

states:

"... plaintiff

fails to demonstrate how he was prejudiced" and any error would
have to be disregarded unless it affected "the substantial rights
of the parties under Rule 61, U.R.C.P.

Reversal would follow

only if Petitioner demonstrated that the error was substantial
and prejudicial and "... deprived [appellant] in some manner of a
full and fair consideration of the disputed issues by the jury."
The Opinion indicates that because of Petitioner's
presentation

of

expert

testimony

and

...

"extensive

thorough

cross-

examination of Dr. Clark," Petitioner has failed to demonstrate
prejudice.

Opinion, supra at 529.

realities of trial practice.

This holding

ignores the

The prejudice was as follows:
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1.

Failure to Provide a Timely Report.

to Mr. Onyeabor involves several dimensions.

The prejudice

The first is the

failure to provide a timely report, as required by Rule 35(b),
U.R.C.P.

That rule states:
. . . the party causing the examination to be
made shall deliver to [the plaintiff] a copy
of a detailed written report of the examining
physician
setting
out his
findings,
including the results of all tests made,
diagnosis and conclusions. ...
(emphasis
added)

Even

though

Dr. Clark

had

been back

in the case since

late

December or early January, no report had apparently been prepared
as of the time of the Motion in Limine, January 30, 1987, so the
court

ordered

defendants

within a few days.

to produce

a report

from

Dr.

Clark

The seven page report was hand-delivered to

Petitioner's counsel on the morning of Wednesday, February 4,
1987, the third day of trial.

(App. 41)

The late delivery of such a report is prejudicial for
many reasons, as any seasoned trial attorney knows.

The report

deals with a complex topic, whether or not someone suffers from
brain injury.

Later that same day, Mr. Onyeabor began calling

his expert witnesses
Nielsen and Goka —

on the brain

injury

issue

(Drs. Moress,

see Vol. D of transcript), and had called

virtually all of these witnesses by the close of trial on Friday,
February 6th.

Thus, none of Petitioner's witnesses really had an

opportunity to read and assess Dr. Clark's report prior to the
time they testified.

Counsel did not have time to analyze the

report and discuss it with his experts, because of the hectic
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nature

of

daily

Petitioner

was

opportunity

trial

preparation

effectively

to

deal

denied

with

in
the

a major

case.

important

and

Clark 1 s

Dr.

Thus,
critical

contentions

with

Petitionees witnesses on direct examination.
In Sirianni v. General Motors Corp., su£ra, the trial
judge excluded the testimony of a physician where the plaintiff
presented no pre-trial report to the defense.

The court regarded

the testimony of the doctor as that of a "new medical witness"
even though

the doctor had treated

prior to trial.

the plaintiff three years

The court held:

The exclusion of such testimony without a
prior report is a well-standing practice in
this court under our pre-trial rules in
support of a strong policy against the
introduction of surprise testimony of expert
opinion witnesses.
Id. at 511.
2.

Inability to Obtain a Deposition.

Because of Dr.

Clarkfs late appearance in the case, and failure to provide a
report until the third day of trial, Petitioner was effectively
denied the opportunity to take a deposition.

If Dr. Clark were a

mere fact witness to the accident, that may not have been quite
so prejudicial.

However, he was the major expert witness called

by the defendants in their attempt to establish that Petitioner
did not suffer from brain injury.
views

of

a

major

expert

determine the outcome.
below).
preparing

witness

Pre-trial discovery of the
is

often

critical

and

can

Such was the case here (see discussion

Such a deposition would have been crucial in properly
direct

testimony

on

the

brain

injury
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issue

the

Petitioner intended to offer on the third, fourth and fifth days
of trial.
advantage

Petitioner's experts were thus deprived of whatever
would

have

been

gleaned

from

having

Dr.

Clark's

deposition in advance of their own testimonies.
The Court of Appeals' Opinion

states the Petitioner

must now somehow demonstrate how this prejudiced the Petitioner.
But how does one show the value of such a deposition that was
never given and therefore not available for comment at trial?

In

a case such as this, failure to timely produce an expert for
deposition should create a rebuttable presumption of prejudice.
Otherwise, this court creates the irony of placing the burden on
the party who has been wronged by the defendants' concealing of
an expert witness, when it was the act of concealing that witness
that inhibits the production of the proof of the prejudice which
resulted.
3.

Report Failed to State a Conclusion.

The failure

of Dr. Clark's report to state a medical conclusion was highly
prejudicial.

The report contained no adverse diagnosis or clue

as to what Dr. Clark's opinion

really was on several

having to do with brain injury (App. 41:7).

issues

The report made no

claim, for example, that Petitioner suffered from any type of a
pre-existing "personality disorder."

This was quite damaging to

Petitioner's case because Dr. Clark did state such an opinion for
the first time on the witness stand at trial.

When Dr. Clark was

asked why there was no diagnosis in his report, he stated:
I could do that readily. I think it is selfevident in terms of it being a personality
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disorder with histrionic features, and also
explosive
features as well.
And his
hysteroid, it is a personality disorder,
other mixed type with histrionic, and I
agree,
an explosive
feature
as well,
(emphasis added) (Note: The actual testimony
was far more lucid; this passage reflects
some confusion by the reporter.)
(T.

L-192:15).

Dr.

Clark

disorder was pre-existing.

also

stated

that

the

personality

Since the doctor brought that up,

counsel was forced to cross-examine on the issue (T. L-193-199).
This gave Dr. Clark an additional opportunity to expound on Mr.
Onyeabor's allegedly pre-existing personality disorder (T. L-1934).

This would have not happened had Mr. Onyeabor's counsel had

the prior opportunity to learn the details of Dr. Clark's opinion
in a complete report.

Furthermore, Petitioner could have dealt

with that issue extensively during the direct examination of his
witnesses during the first week of trial.
E.
The

INADEQUATE CROSS-EXAMINATION.

Court

of

Appeals1

Opinion

states

prejudice to Petitioner because of Petitionees
examination of Dr. Clark.
cross-examination
examination.
instance,

was

no

lengthy cross-

As any trial lawyer knows, lengthy
frequently

is bad,

It sometimes reflects lack of preparation.

In this

the

is not

there

always

examination

was

good, and

lengthy

because

Petitioner's

counsel was forced, in essence, to do discovery on the witness
stand.

It is an uncomfortable and an unfair position to be in.

Had Mr. Onyeabor had

the opportunity

to discover Dr. Clark!s

opinions prior to the trial, the cross-examination
been more effective, and completed in half the time.
30
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

would

have

The
merely

fact

entitled

of the matter

to an

rules

dictate

of

that

court,

deposition,

not

was

not

in which to

of defendants1 major expert witness.

professional

Petitioner

cross-examination.

Petitioner

interval of time at trial

conduct cross-examination
The

is that

is

courtesy

entitled

This

to

presupposes

taken during

and

common

sense

effectively-prepared
a

timely,

the heat of battle

pre-trial

in a

12-day

trial, with inadequate preparation and no opportunity to consult
with

Petitioner's

experts.

Such basic

fairness

and

courtesy

presupposes an opportunity to review, in quiet reflection, Dr.
Clark's views in order to prepare cross-examination, and to do so
sooner than Friday, the 13th, on the 10th day of a 12-day trial.
F.

SUMMARY.

The Court of Appeals has sanctioned the concealing of a
major expert witness until the last minute, and then asserted
that

Petitioner

wrongful

act

prejudice.
trial

cannot

any

significantly

prejudice

inhibits

thereby,

the

showing

when

the

of

that

This decision further ignores practical prejudice in

practice.

experts.

show

It

It

damages

will

encourage

the utility

particularly Rules 26(e) and 35(b).

of

the

late

disclosure

the

laws

of

of

discovery,

One might as well tear out

those pages because they are not going to be enforced by the
Court of Appeals.
This

case

allows

one party to greatly

and

unfairly

enhance the burden upon his or her opponent in litigation.

Even

though a party intends to use an expert witness a month and half
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before a major trial, he can wait until six business days before
the trial and hand-deliver a notice of the new expert to his
opponent.

Under Onyeabor, the offending party will "appear to

have substantially complied with Rule 26(e)(1)"

(Opinion, supra

at 528) because that amount of time has been validated by the
Court of Appeals.

Furthermore, counsel will not have to deliver

a Rule 35(b) report to the other side until the third day of
trial, because that has been validated by the Court of Appeals.
Additionally, the report can be evasive on the doctor's ultimate
diagnosis
substance"

of

the
of

client

the

as

long

testimony

Opinion, supra at 528.

is

as

the

"subject

contained

in

matter
the

and

report.

At the very least, the offending party

will gain substantial advantage over his opponent, even if his
opponent does manage to find the time to take the deposition of
the doctor during trial.
//
//
//
//
//
//
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CONCLUSION
This case is bad law.

The Supreme Court should reverse

it and remand it for a new trial.
DATED this 23th day of April, 1990.

ROBERT B. SYKES
Attorney for Petitioner
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ONYEABOR v. PRO ROOFING, INC.

Utah

525

Cite as 787 ?2d 525 (UtahApp0 1990)

Emmanuel N. ONYEABOR, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
PRO ROOFING, INC., a Utah corporation, and Pam Bates, Defendants
and Respondents.
No. S70265-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Feb. 13, 1990.
Northbound driver brought action
against westbound driver and her husband's business to recover for injuries
caused by collision. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Bryant H. Croft,
Senior Judge, entered judgment on jury
verdict in favor of northbound driver and
denied his motions for a new trial, judgment notwithstanding verdict, and additur.
Northbound driver appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Bench, J., held that: (1) allegedly
erroneous admission of testimony of defense expert who was identified for northbound driver 12 days before trial did not
prejudice him; (2) northbound driver was
not negligent; and (3) evidence supported
damage awards.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.
1. Courts e = l l l
Precept that record should be made of
all proceedings applies to conferences in
chambers as well as courtroom proceedings.
2. Appeal and Error 3=654
Affidavits which were not pan of
record beiow could not supplement record
on appeal.

Proa, Rules 26(e)(1), 61; U.C.A.1953, 41-646(1X1981).
4. Appeai and Error <3=241
Plaintiffs pretrial motion to exclude
testimony of defense expert preserved issue, even though plaintiff failed to object
to expert's testimony.
5. Automobiles <5=>167(1)
Driver who was approaching intersection in his own lane of traffic at or near
speed limit was not negligent when he collided with a car that pulled out from a
shopping center.
6. Damages <3=>130(3), 133, 134(1), 135
Evidence supported awards of $4,000
for pain and suffering during four months
following automobile accident, 81,850 for
medical expenses, $4,500 for loss of earnings, $5,000 for future medical and psychotherapy expenses, and $1,500 for future
lost earnings; jury could believe evidence
of back injury and could disbelieve evidence
of head injury or causal connection between head injur/ and accident; and evidence indicated that injured driver possibly
had preexisting back condition.

Robert B. Sykes and M. Gale Lemmon,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
William A. Stegall, Jr., Salt Lake City,
for defendants and respondents.
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and
GREENWOOD, JJ.
BENCH, Judge:
Plaintiff appeals from a jury verdict in
his favor in an action arising from injuries
sustained in a motor vehicle accident. We
affirm in part and reverse in part.

FACTS
:;. Appeai and Error 3=1043(1)
Allegedly erroneous admission of testiOn June 15, 1984, plaintiff Emmanuel M.
mony of defense expert who was identified Onyeabor was driving home for lunch from
for plaintiff 12 days before trial did not his job as a carpenter on a construction
prejudice plaintiff, expert was one of five project in Midvaie, Utah. At approximatedefense experts in response to testimony of ly 1:10 p.m., he was traveling north on 900
Digitized by
Howard W. Hunter
Library, thorJ. Reuben East
Clark Law
BYU.
plaintiffs
15theexperts;
and Law
plaintiff
in School,
unincorporated
Sait Lake County,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Boulevard (7105 South). Plaintiffs vehicle
was in the inside of two northbound lanes
and was traveling at or near the posted
speed limit of 45 m.p.h.
As plaintiff approached the intersection,
a car driven by defendant Pam Bates entered 900 East from a shopping center on
the southeast corner of the intersection.
Bates was en route to perform an errand
for her husband's business, defendant Pro
Roofing, Inc. Bates intended to turn west
onto Fort Union Boulevard from 900 East,
and crossed over the northbound lanes of
900 East to enter the left turn lane. The
drivers' views of each other were obstructed by a northbound vehicle between them.
When Bates's car suddenly entered plaintiff's lane of traffic, plaintiff attempted to
stop, but could not, and skidded into
Bates's vehicle. The collision caused minor
damage to the right side of his car and the
left rear bumper of Bates's car.
Moments after the collision, plaintiff approached Bates's car and began shouting
and cursing at her and pounding on the
driver's side window. Bates remained in
her vehicle. Eventually, plaintiff left to
contact the sheriffs department, which dispatched a deputy to investigate the accident. The deputy's report indicated that
neither party complained of injury at the
time of the accident.
Six months later, plaintiff brought suit,
alleging that he had sustained "severe and
continuing bodily injuries" in the accident,
and sought damages for medical expenses
and loss of earnings. The record indicates
that he was treated in August 1984 for
"low back pain," which he said he had
experienced since the accident. This problem was subsequently diagnosed as a herniated lumbar disk and was treated without
surgery.

after the accident, plaintiff filed a motion
to amend his complaint to allege damages
for "closed-head brain injur}' and/or posttraumatic syndrome." The motion was
granted with defendants' stipulation, and
plaintiff amended his complaint to allege
damages in excess of S600.000 for back,
shoulder, head, and left wrist injuries.
Plaintiff subsequently submitted an extensive pretrial brief, claiming that he wai"permanentiy and totally disabled from future meaningful employment." He sought
damages in the amount of §1,152,498.79.
Trial was held February 2-1S, 1987. After more than thirty witnesses testified and
more than a hundred exhibits were received, the jury returned a special verdict
in favor of plaintiff. Total damages were
found to be $16,850, but the jury determined that 25% of the negligence involved
in the accident was attributable to plaintiff.
Plaintiff was awarded $12,637.50 plus interest and costs, and the trial court denied
his "Motions for a New Trial, for Judgment
N.O.V. and for Additur."
ISSUES
Plaintiff appeals the jury verdict, claiming that: (1) the trial judge was biased
against him, and that such bias was manifested in the judge's demeanor and comments on the evidence; (2) the trial court
erred by permitting a defense witness to
testify at trial without adequate notice; (3)
there was insufficient evidence to support
the jury's finding that plaintiff was partially negligent; (4) the trial court abused its
discretion in denying plaintiffs motion for
additur or, in the alternative, new trial:
and (5) the trial court erred in making
certain evidentiary rulings.
ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs continuing treatment necessiI
tated a continuance of the trial originally
The procedure for resolving allegations
scheduled for August 1985. Trial was continued without date, and plaintiffs attor- of judicial bias is provided by Utah R.Civ.Fney withdrew from the case. Plaintiff re- 63(b):
Whenever a party to any action ... or
tained new counsel and trial was reset.
his attorney shall make and file an affiShortly thereafter, plaintiff again disDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
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Reuben
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School,
BYU. such
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such judge shall proceed
prejudice .
no further therein, except to call in another judge to hear and determine the
matter.
Every such affidavit shall state the
facts and the reasons for the belief that
such bias or prejudice exists, and shall be
filed as soon as practicable after . . .
such bias or prejudice is known.
See also Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114,
1116 (Utah Ct.App.1989).
In this case, plaintiff never filed such an
affidavit, even after the alleged bias admittedly became known co him during the first
day or two of trial.1 We need not decide,
however, whether the sole failure to file
this affidavit was procedurally fatal to the
claim of bias, since there are a number of
other infirmities underlying plaintiffs
claim.
Defendants assert chat plaintiff failed to
make contemporaneous objections to the
court's comments alleged to be prejudicial.
"If something occurs which the party
thinks is wrong and so prejudicial :o him
that he thereafter cannot have a fair trial,
he must make his objection promptly and
seek redress by moving for a mistrial, or
by having cautionary instructions given, if
that is deemed adequate, or be held to
waive whatever rights may have existed to
do so." Hill v. Cloward. 14 Utah 2d 55.
53, 377 P.2d 186, 188 (1962). Otherwise.
•*[i]t would be manifestly unjust co permit a
party to sit silently by. believing that prejudicial error had been committed" and :hen
''if he loses, come forward" claiming error.
Id.
Plaintiff states that, "Obviously, Mr.
Onyeabor's counsel vas reluctant :o object
every time the jour: commented :n the
evidence." Although reluctance co make
frequent objections may be understandable, we railed co rind in the portions of the
record highlighted by plaintiff even one
such contemporaneous objection. Nor can
we find any motion made by plaintiff for a
mistrial. Plaintiff states chat such a mo-

cion was "impractical because Mr. Onyeabor needed to have the case tried for medical reasons."
[1] Plaintiff nonetheless argues that he
made a proper objection in chambers after
the third day of trial. The discussion between counsel and the court went unrecorded because the reporter had departed
for the day. The precept that a record
should be made of all proceedings applies
to conferences in chambers as well as
courtroom proceedings. Birch, 771 P.2d at
1116. "The burden is on the parties to
make certain that the record they compile
will adequately preserve their arguments
for review in the event of an appeal."
Franklin Fin. v. New Empire Dev. Co.,
659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983).
We are thus constrained by the record,
which includes the following remarks by
the trial judge during the hearing on plaintiffs motion for new trial:
You have made mention of the fact . . .
that some of your witnesses sitting in
the courtroom told you that it was obvious that the judge didn't like you. Weil,
again if they got that impression, I'm
sorry, because that isn't true
But you go on in your brief stressing
the fact that my conduct throughout the
trial gave the jury a powerful message
that your methods were time consuming,
meaningless, perhaps an attempt to put
something over on the jury. That surprised me
And you suggest that my
conduct, by the tone of my voice, by the
shrug of my shoulders, by a sigh, gave a
powerful message to the jury that I
didn't think much of your case, and I was
trying to hurry the case along and noc
willing to give you a fair shake
The
only way I can respond to that sort of
indictment of the Court's conduct at the
trial is by saying I plead not guilty
I deny that throughout the trial I did
things intentionally or unintentionally to
discredit you or your witnesses or to the
face of the jury.

!. See Madsen ;'. Prudential fed. Saw i& Loan,
only when rulings are unfavorable. "Not only
767 ?.2d 558, 542 vUtah Cr.App.1988) -.Motions
is such a tactic unfair, but it may evidence a
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[2] There is nothing to contradict defendants' observation that the questioned remarks were "simply explanatory statements made by the court either in the
course of ruling on objections, or limiting
the admissibility of evidence or testimony.
or clarifying the testimony given by a witness." 2 Based on our review of the
record, including the instructions given to
the jury,c we reject plaintiffs claim of bias.
II
[3] Plaintiff also claims that the court
erred in admitting the testimony of Dr.
Lincoln Clark, an expert witness for the
defense. Plaintiff describes Dr. Clark as a
"surprise" witness in that plaintiff had no
notice of his planned testimony until six
business days before trial and did not r e
ceive a copy of Dr. Clark's report until the
third day of trial.
Defendants retained the services of Dr.
Clark, a psychiatrist, after a previous expert was unable to continue his involvement in the case due to ill health. After
interviewing plaintiff. Dr. Clark determined
that his involvement in the case constituted
a significant risk to his safety and the
safety of his family. On December 5,1986,
the court continued the trial date based on
Dr. Clark's assertion that his disassociation
with the case was final. On January 21,
1987, however, defendants filed an amended witness list on which Dr. Clark's name
reappeared. Defendants contended that
Dr. Clark had reevaluated his decision, and
became convinced he had overstated the
threat to his safety. Plaintiff then filed a
motion in limine to exclude Dr. Clark as a
witness. Judge Croft heard the motion on
January 30, the Friday before trial, and
decided to permit Dr. Clark to testify provided that a written report wras submitted
2. Plaintiff has attempted to supplement the
record on appeal with affidavits attesting to
alleged nonverbal manifestations of bias on the
part of the trial judge. Although his motion was
provisionally granted pending the hearing of
this appeal, affidavits which are not pan of the
record below will generally not be considered
on appeal. See State v. Aase, 762 P.2d 1113,
lllTYUtah Ct.App.1988). Accordingly, we now
deny plaintiffs motion to supplement the
record.

to plaintiff the first day or two of trial. A
copy of that report was subsequently delivered to plaintiff early Wednesday morning,
the third day of trial. Dr. Clark testified
on February 13, nine days later; plaintiff
neither objected to the testimony nor
moved for a continuance.
[4] Defendants argue that plaintiff
failed to preserve the issue for appeal by
failing to object at the time Dr. Clark was
called to the witness stand. However,
plaintiffs pretrial motion to exclude the
testimony was adequate to preserve the
issue. "A matter is sufficiently raised if it
is submitted to the trial court, and the
court is afforded an opportunity7 to rule on
the issue." Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917,
924 (Utah CtApp.1989) (quoting State v.
One 1979 Pontiac Trans Am, 771 P.2d 682.
684 (Utah Ct.App.1989)).
The essence of plaintiffs objection appears to be that he was prejudiced because
there was insufficient time prior to trial to
depose Dr. Clark. However, defendants
appear to have substantially complied with
rule 26(e)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure requiring a party to
seasonably supplement his response with
respect to any question directly addressed to . . . the identity of each person
expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject matier on which
he is expected to testify, and the substance of his testimony.
Dr. Clark was identified twelve days before trial and plaintiffs counsel was familiar with Dr. Clark from his testimony in
another head injury lawsuit. The subject
matter and substance of the expert's testimony was contained in the report delivered
to plaintiff nine days before Dr. Clark testified.
3. See, eg., Jury Instruction No. 2:
Anything done or said by me during the tnai
should not be considered by you as indicating
my view on any issue in this case. Any belie:
you may have as to what my view may be
should receive no consideration by you in
your deliberations.
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Even if we assume that the admission of
Dr. Clark's testimony constituted error,
plaintiff fails to demonstrate how he was
prejudiced. Any error in the admission of
evidence must be disregarded unless it affects the substantial rights of the parties.
Utah R.Civ.P, 61. This provision has been
construed as "placing upon an appellant
the burden of showing not only that an
error occurred, but that it was substantial
and prejudicial in that the appellant was
deprived in some manner of a full and fair
consideration of the disputed issues by the
jury." Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147,
154 (Utah 1987). Dr. Clark was but one of
five expert witnesses called by defendants
in response to the testimony of plaintiffs
fifteen experts. In view of the extensive
presentation of expert testimony and plaintiffs thorough cross-examination of Dr.
Clark, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate
prejudice resulting from the admission of
Dr. Clark's testimony. Accordingly, we
conclude that plaintiffs claim is without
merit.

Ill
[5] We next address plaintiffs contention that there was insufficient evidence to
support a finding of negligence on the part
of plaintiff. A jury verdict will be reversed
"only if, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict, there is no
substantial evidence to support it." Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d
414, 417 (Utah 1989) (quoting In re Estate
o/Kesler, 702 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1985)). An
appellant must marshal all the evidence
supporting the verdict and then show that
the evidence is insufficient to support it
even when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Von Hake v. Thomas,
705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985).

No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed
greater than is reasonable and prudent
under the conditions and having regard
to the actual and potential hazards then
existing. Consistent with the foregoing,
every person shall drive at a safe and
appropriate speed when approaching and
crossing an intersection or . . . when special hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of
weather or highway conditions.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46(1) (1981).
Although a jury may determine that the
operation of a motor vehicle within the
speed limit may be negligent under given
circumstances, see Lochhead v. Jensen, 42
Utah 99, 102-03, 129 P. 347, 348-49 (1912),
there is no evidence indicating that plaintiff
drove faster than was reasonable and prudent, or that the speed was unsafe and
inappropriate, or that road or weather conditions necessitated a slower speed. Nor
was there evidence of special hazards or
unsafe driver behavior. The only evidence
that was offered to suggest that plaintiff
was negligent was the testimony of one of
the defense experts who was "concerned"
that plaintiffs car was still moving at the
speed limit "that close to an intersection."
In short, we could find no substantial evidence that would support a reduction in
damages for plaintiffs negligence. Accordingly, we reverse the special verdict
attributing 25?o of the total negligence to
plaintiff.
IV

[6] The final contention of plaintiff
which we fully address is that involving the
trial court's denial of his motion for additur
or, in the alternative, a new trial. Under
rule 59(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, a new trial may be granted or a
new judgment may be entered if the influWe have reviewed the evidence mar- ence of passion or prejudice resulted in
shaled by plaintiff and agree that it cannot inadequate damages. "However, when the
support a finding that plaintiff was partial- damages are not so inadequate as to indily negligent. There is no dispute that cate a disregard of the evidence by the
plaintiff was traveling in his own lane of jury, a court is not empowered to entertain
traffic at or near the speed limit before the a motion for an additur." Duvuis v. Nietaccident.
The relevant statutory provision son,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
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award stems from the "prerogative of the
jury to make the determination of damages." Jensen v. Eakins, 575 P.2d 179,
180 (Utah 1978). "[W]e cannot substitute
our judgment for that of the fact finder
unless the evidence compels a finding that
reasonable men and women would, of necessity, come to a different conclusion."
Id.
Plaintiff alleged various injuries resulting from the accident, including injuries to
his back and head. The jury's verdict obviously reflects the fact that they believed
plaintiffs evidence of a back injury, but
either did not believe that there was a head
injury or that it was not caused by the
accident.
In closing argument, defense counsel
summarized plaintiffs damages that were
consistent with a back injury. He calculated plaintiffs medical expenses to be $1,835.
The jury awarded plaintiff $1,850. Defense counsel estimated plaintiffs loss of
earnings to be $3,200. The jury awarded
$4,500. Defense counsel suggested that
$4,000 was a reasonable sum for general
damages for pain and suffering during the
four months following the accident. The
jury awarded plaintiff $4,000. The jury
also awarded plaintiff $5,000 for future
medical and psychotherapy expenses and
$1,500 for future lost earnings. These
amounts appear to be reasonable, particularly in view of other evidence that plaintiff
may have had a preexisting back condition
which was aggravated by the accident and
an incident in a "karate class."
On the other hand, defense counsel argued that plaintiff demonstrated "no loss
of consciousness, no amnesia, no external
sign of injury" after the accident—in short,
"no sound evidence" of brain injury. This
hotly disputed question of fact was for the
jury, whose exclusive province it is to
weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses. See Steele v. Breinholt, 747 P.2d 433, 436 (Utah Ct.App.1987).
We conclude that "reasonable minds acting
fairly" could lack "reasonable certainty
that plaintiff suffered such injur}' and damage." Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman, 584 P.2d 894, 896 (Utah

1978). Thus, plaintiff simply failed to convince the jury of his entire case.
With respect to plaintiffs claims regarding various evidentiary rulings, a trial
court's determination to admit or exclude
evidence will not be overturned in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Pearce v.
Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 1985).
We have reviewed the rulings in question
and conclude that there was no abuse of
discretion.
In summary, we affirm the finding of
liability against defendants, but reverse the
finding of negligence attributable to plaintiff and remand the case to modify the
judgment consistent with this opinion.
BILLINGS and GREENWOOD, JJ.,
concur.
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Sharleen M. McREYNOLDS, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Glenn L. McREYNOLDS, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 890172-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Feb. 13, 1990.

Former wife sought to recover past
due child support. Former husband filed
counterpetition seeking reduction and revision in schedule for visitation. The Fourth
District Court, Utah Count}', George E.
Ballif, J., refused to award judgment for
unpaid child support. Wife appealed. The
Court of Appeals held that wife's interference with or prevention of husband's exercise of visitation rights did not permit trial
court to extinguish past due child support.
Reversed and remanded.
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Rule 26

impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result,
(i) The court shall require that the party seeking discovery
pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to
discovery under Subdivisions (b)(4)(A)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this
rule; and
(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision
(b)(4)(A)(ii) of this rule the court may require, and with respect
to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(4)(B) of this rule the
court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other
party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred
by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert.
(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is
pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the
district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following:
(1) that the discovery not be had;
(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place;
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other
than that selected by the party seeking discovery;
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the
discovery be limited to-certain matters;
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons
designated by the court;
(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the
court;
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way;
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court
may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person
provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award
of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Unless the court upon motion, for
the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders
otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact that
a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not
operate to delay any other party's discovery.
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has responded to a request for discovery with a response that was complete when made is under no
duty to supplement his response to include information thereafter acquired,
except as follows:
(1) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with
respect to any question directly addressed to (A) the identity and location
75
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of persons having knowledge of discoverable matters, and (B) the identity
of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the
subject matter on which he is expected to testify, and the substance of his
testimony.
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he
obtains information upon the basis of which (A) he knows that the response was incorrect when made, or (B) he knows that the response
though correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances are
such that a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing
concealment.
(3) A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the
court, agreement of the parties, or at any time prior to trial through new
requests for supplementation of prior responses.
(f) Discovery conference. At any time after commencement of an action,
the court may direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a
conference on the subject of discovery. The court shall do so upon motion by
the attorney for any party if the motion includes:
(1) a statement of the issues as they then appear;
(2) a proposed plan and schedule of discovery;
(3) any limitations proposed to be placed on discovery;
(4) any other proposed orders with respect to discovery; and
(5) a statement showing that the attorney making the motion has
made a reasonable effort to reach agreement with opposing attorneys on
the matters set forth in the motion. Each party and his attorney are
under a duty to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery
plan if a plan is proposed by the attorney for any party. Notice of the
motion shall be served on all parties. Objections or additions to matters
set forth in the motion shall be served not later than ten days after
service of the motion.
Following the discovery conference, the court shall enter an order tentatively identifying the issues for discovery purposes, establishing a plan and
schedule for discovery, setting limitations on discovery, if any, and determining such other matters, including the allocation of expenses, as are necessary
for the proper management of discovery in the action. An order may be altered
or amended whenever justice so requires.
Subject to the right of a party who properly moves for a discovery conference
to prompt convening of the conference, the court may combine the discovery
conference with a pretrial conference authorized by Rule 16.
(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every
request for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his
individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign the request, response, or objection and state
his address. The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification
that he has read the request, response, or objection and that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is: (1)
consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the
76
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 35

Rule 35, Physical and mental examination of persons.
(a) Order for examination. When the mental or physical condition (including the blood group) of a party, or of a person in the custody or under the
legal control of a party is in controversy, the court in which the action is
pending may order the party to submit to a physical or mental examination by
a physician or to produce for examination the person in his custody or legal
control. The order may be made only on motion for good cause shown and upon
notice to the person to be examined and to all parties and shall specify the
time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the person
or persons by whom it is to be made.
(b) Report of examining physician.
(1) If requested by the party against whom an order is made under
Rule 35(a) or the person examined, the party causing the examination to
be made shall deliver to him a copy of a detailed written report of the
examining physician setting out his findings, including results of all tests
made, diagnosis and conclusions, together with like reports of all earlier
examinations of the same condition. After delivery the party causing the
examination shall be entitled upon request to receive from the party
against whom the order is made a like report of any examination, previously or thereafter made, of the same condition, unless, in the case of a
report of examination of a person not a party, the party shows that he is
unable to obtain it. The court on motion may make an order against a
party requiring delivery of a report on such terms as are just, and if a
physician fails or refuses to make a report the court may exclude his
testimony if offered at the trial.
(2) By requesting and obtaining a report of the examination so ordered
or by taking the deposition of the examiner, the party examined waives
any privilege he may have in that action or any other involving the same
controversy, regarding the testimony of every other person who has examined or may thereafter examine him in respect of the same mental or
physical condition.
(3) This subdivision applies to examinations made by agreement of the
parties, unless the agreement expressly provides otherwise. This subdivision does not preclude discovery of a report of an examining physician or
the taking of a deposition of the physician in accordance with the provisions of any other rule.
(c) Right of party examined to other medical reports. At the time of
making an order to submit to a medical examination under Subdivision (a) of
this rule, the court shall, upon motion of the party to be examined, order the
party seeking such examination to furnish to the party to be examined a
report of any examination previously made or medical treatment previously
given by any physician employed directly or indirectly by the party seeking
the order for a physical or mental examination, or at whose instance or request such medical examination or treatment has previously been conducted.
If the party seeking the examination refuses to deliver such report, the court
on motion and notice may make an order requiring delivery on such terms as
are just; and if a physician fails or refuses to make such a report the court may
exclude his testimony if offered at the trial, or may make such other order as
is authorized under Rule 37.
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